The Market for Reputations as an Incentive Mechanism

Journal of Political Economy 110, no. 4 (2002): 854-882
The Market for Reputations as an Incentive Mechanism
Steve Tadelis

Reputational career concern provide incentive for short lived agent to work hard, but it is well known that these incentive disappear as an agent reaches retirement. This paper investigates the effect of a market for firm reputation on the life-cycle incentives of firm owners to exert effort.

A dynamic general equilibrium model with moral hazard and adverse selection generates two main results. First, incentives of young and old agents are quantitatively equal, implying that incentives are "ageless" with a market for reputations.

Second, good reputations cannot act as effective sorting devices: in equilibrium, more able agent cannot outbid lesser ones in the market for good reputations. In addition, welfare analysis shows that social surplus can fall if clients observe trade in firm reputation. (JELC70, D82, L14, L15)

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Canary in the e-Commerce Coal Mine: Detecting and Predicting Poor Experiences Using Buyer-to-Seller Messages

Dimitriy Masterov, Uwe Mayer, Steve Tadelis

Reputation and feedback systems in online marketplaces are often biased, making it difficult to ascertain the quality of sellers. We use post-transaction, buyer-to-seller message traffic to detect signals of unsatisfactory transactions on eBay. We posit that a message sent after the item was paid for serves as a reliable indicator that the buyer may be unhappy with that purchase, particularly when the message included words associated with a negative experience. The fraction of a seller's message traffic that was negative predicts whether a buyer who transacts with this seller will stop purchasing on eBay, implying that platforms can use these messages as an additional signal of seller quality.